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Hidetada Shimizu of personal experience in the varied settings of individual lives, the evidence from formal assessment procedures is thin, and its validity questionable. Because investigators cannot know in advance the variability and complexity of indigenous experience, bypassing the individual experience, as Markus and Kitayama and Wierzbicka do, risks imposing the classification system of the investigators rather than that of the "natives." First, I shall argue that the meaning of personal experience is often equivocal (i.e., open to two or more interpretations) and multidimensional (located in more than one level of experience). I shall use the concept of omoiyari (sensitivity to others) to illustrate that semantic and pragmatic definitions of the concept, such as those provided by Lebra (1976) , alone cannot predict or fully capture the variety and depth of individual experience. The content of such personal experience cannot be captured by these static descriptors, because individual experiences are variable and multiplex and because they are influenced by motives that underlie observable behaviors.
Second, I shall argue that the empathic understanding of the lived experience of the Japanese (or any cultural or national group) cannot be achieved through the experimental approach (of Markus and Kitayama), which uses hypothetical situations to highlight intergroup (that is, Japanese versus American) differences; or the cultural grammar approach (of Wierzbicka), which attempts to translate culture-specific meaning into a "natural semantic metalanguage."
Finally, I shall consider the strengths and the limitations of Markus and Kitayama's and Wierzbicka's approaches in light of the psychologist Donald Campbell's (1988) previous attempt to combat naïve ethnocentrism (i.e., "phenomenal absolutism") of academic psychology.
EXPERIENTIAL APPROACH TO OMOIYARI
Before discussing the equivocal and multiplex natures of real-life experience concerning omoiyari, it is necessary to discuss first how this concept has been conceptualized in the anthropological literature on Japan. As Spiro (1993) points out, few anthropological studies have looked into the private experiences of people. Most of them attempted to translate cultural norms, particularly the meanings of culturally indigenous concepts and normative behaviors. Of these approaches, two types of analyses are most common: semantic and pragmatic definitions of the culture-specific concepts. The semantic translation gives formal, dictionary-like definitions of cultural concepts, whereas the pragmatic translation gives examples of normative contexts in which these concepts derive their culture-specific meanings. Lebra's (1976) chapter on omoiyari in her book, The Japanese Patterns of Behavior, contains perhaps the most comprehensive and widely cited examples of semantic and pragmatic definitions of omoiyari. In terms of semantics, she defines omoiyari as "the ability and willingness to feel what others are feeling, to vicariously experience the pleasure and pain that they are undergoing, and to help them satisfy their wishes" (Lebra, 1976, p. 38) .
In terms of pragmatics, she conceptualizes omoiyari as part of the larger cultural ethos of "social relativism." Omoiyari is an expression of "social preoccupation," the first element of social relativism, because the objects of Japanese individuals' primary concerns are not abstract ideas and principles but people inhabiting their social world. It is also part of what she calls "interactional relativism," the other component, in that individuals make personal decisions in conjunction with what they consider other people are thinking and feeling in a given situation. For example, if someone wants to go to a movie, but he or she also knows no one else wants to, he or she may decide not to go to honor other people's preference not to go. Another example Lebra uses is ozendate, where a Japanese host prepares things ahead of time in anticipation of what the guest may desire. According to the Japanese cultural script, it is improper to ask guests what they want to be served (for example, coffee or tea). Rather, it is appropriate to do a little research on the guest's taste ahead of time and serve them something based on an educated guess. Such intention, or magokoro -"sincere heart," as the Japanese put it -to serve others in the spirit of omoiyari is valued more highly than correctly guessing guests' preferences.
Many of Lebra's examples are culturally normative patterns of behaviors derived from her own knowledge as an expert interpreter of Japanese culture, a Japanese native, and a trained anthropologist. Few of them are descriptions of the lived experience of real-life individuals. Thus, the individual motives that exist behind these culturally normative scripts are left out. In other words, once a certain pattern of behavior is institutionalized as a cultural (i.e., shared) norm, individuals can always choose to act behind it, much the way a puppet master animates a scripted puppet play with his own emotions and interpretations. Such private motives are not revealed in the semantic and pragmatic definitions of the normative script alone, but through detailed descriptions of individual lives and circumstances from which the script derives more specific and deeper personal meaning. The variations and depths of such motives behind the omoiyari script will be discussed next.
The evidence is drawn from long-term, repeated interviews with adolescents in a Japanese high school -a private academic school. The interviewees Introduction 3 reflect on the issues of achievement, moral conflict, and interpersonal behavior (Shimizu, 1993a) . 1 From these interviews, I wrote case studies of four adolescents, three of whom will appear in this chapter: they are: Yasuhiko, a fifteen-year-old boy with a history of being bullied; Yumi, a seventeenyear-old girl who questions her own sincerity because she acts differently in different social situations; and Takeshi, an eighteen-year-old boy who plays soccer and volunteers his services fixing school bathroom switches broken by delinquents. I also draw on data from an open-ended questionnaire administered to students in this school, personal experience as a native of Japan and as an anthropological researcher there, and published works describing the real-life experiences and social behavior of Japanese people. There are at least three heuristically distinguishable, if not exhaustive or mutually exclusive, ways in which the omoiyari script can be experienced and acted out by individual Japanese: to fulfill cultural common sense, to sabotage, and to experience conflict and ambivalence.
Cultural Common Sense
When individuals think, feel, or behave in a certain way, and believe that their actions are so perfectly "good" and "normal" that they are not aware of or would not approve of any alternatives, they are conforming to scripts that are part of "cultural common sense" (Geertz, 1983, pp. 73-93) . Omoiyari, as Lebra notes, is one such prevalent and idealized cultural common sense.
To be more precise, one can further divide the personal motives to fulfill the omoiyari scripts as cultural common sense into subcategories: coerced and willing conformity (see LeVine, 1982) and complacent conformity.
In coerced conformity, someone of a subordinate social position unilaterally adapts and performs the script for fear of punishment or concern for survival (e.g., being fired from a job or ostracized from a community). People who succumb to coerced conformity are generally those in servant roles
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1 The interview and questionnaire data were collected in a private Protestant junior and senior high school outside of Tokyo. Two male and two female students were chosen haphazardly from each grade from the seventh to the twelfth. During our first interview session (one to one-and-one-half hours long), we talked about general aspects of their lives: the past year, self-descriptions, school and home life, and so on. Some students agreed to more interviews, and to these, I sent a letter asking them to remember experiences in which they (a) worked very hard at something (achievement); and (b) had to make decision about right versus wrong (morality). Follow-up interviews were conducted three, six, and nine months later. During these interviews, the informants reflected on the meaning and implications of their own experiences. I visited their homes to interview their parents. I also gave several written, open-ended questionnaires to 198 high school students (118 girls and 80 boys).
and citizens under repressive dictatorships (LeVine, 1982) . The notion, however, can be applied to people at large when they submit to normative pressures of given sociocultural roles that forbid or constrict expressions of private motives. For example, Japanese society (and presumably many others, including the United States) offers many occupation-and social-status-related role behaviors that are so rigidly prescribed by linguistic scripts that individual speakers deviate little from them. One example is a merchant uttering a set phrase to attract customers, such as "irrashai mase" (come in and let us serve you). Also at a train station, people are reminded to step behind the white line ("hakusen no ushiro made sagatte kudasai") to keep a safe distance from the incoming train. When passengers are about to get off the train, they are reminded again not to leave their belongings behind ("owasure mono nai you otashi kame kudasai"). One hears these set phrases over and over again in Japan as institutionalized expressions of omoiyari.
There are other variants of such fixed, occupation-and social-status-related omoiyari role behaviors. On the busy streets of larger cities, for example, pedestrians often encounter a person giving away pocket-sized tissues with a company's promotions printed on the back. The distributors will say something like, "How are you? Hot day, isn't it? How about a tissue to wipe off your sweat?" as if to say, "Here's my omoiyari for you. I am committed to maximizing your comfort." It is more than likely, however, that the tissue distributors are merely conforming to the sales tactics prescribed by their employers.
In willing conformity, by contrast, there is a high degree of congruence between culturally prescribed role behavior and the individual's desire to fulfill its requirements, so that enactment of the role behaviors creates personal satisfaction in the performer. The example of an eighteen-year-old boy named Takeshi (Shimizu, 1993a) below indicates that individuals not only conform willingly to omoiyari scripts, but go beyond them to generate their own, individualized omoiyari scripts. In Takeshi's school, there were a number of delinquents who routinely tampered with the light switches in a school bathroom. Takeshi volunteered to fix these switches with his teacher. Asked why, he explained that he was sympathetic to the delinquents. He learned from his mother, the school nurse, that these boys came from broken homes and knew no better way of expressing their individuality. So, he said, instead of punishing them, one needs to wait patiently for them to repent by modeling good behavior.
Cross-referencing this incident with other stories told by the same informant led me to believe that he wanted to fix these switches as a voluntary Introduction 5 personal decision. For example, he decided not to tell a girl that he wanted to go out with because of his concern that, in doing so, he might bother her while she was preparing for all-important college entrance exams. He also quickly decided which college to attend in order to make his dying grandfather happy. These behaviors are all congruent with his self-professed (during the interview) personality of being kind and nice to others (yasashii). In his own words, there are so many starving people in the world, but he had all the food he could eat and parents to pay for his education. He said that he felt naturally obligated to repay the goodness he received from other people. Thus, it appears that he fixed the bathroom switches out of his genuine concern for the delinquents, not to submit to any external authorities (Shimizu, 1993a, p. 426) . Finally, the omoiyari script can be so standardized as a culturally prescribed role behavior that individuals perform the script without realizing its original meaning: attending and catering to other people's needs through empathy. Such rigid adherence to a specific script that appears empathic but permits no variation in the interests of an unanticipated call for empathic response is "complacent conformity." For example, my wife and I went to a discount store in a suburb of one of Japan's major cities to buy household items. We saw a little hut in which vendors were cooking and selling takoyaki (a grilled ball of flour mixed with a tiny piece of octopus, or tako, placed in the center), with the lively calling of, "Irasshai mase irasshai mase" ("Come in! Come in, please! We are ready to serve you!"). The person who was shouting this was a teenaged girl, who seemed to be hired to do this on a part-time basis. She seemed to epitomize her role as a takoyaki sales clerk: energetic, upbeat, and ready to serve. At this time, we found a crying child who obviously was lost and looking for her mother. Sensing that the child needed help, my wife asked the young women behind the takoyaki stand, "Excuse me, but this girl seems to be lost. Would there be a place where I can get help? Maybe someone can make an announcement." At this moment, the clerk looked as if she were caught totally off guard, and she suddenly looked away so that she did not have to respond to my wife. It was as if she refused to come out of her occupational role and help us personally. The point of the story is that individuals can become so deeply selfidentified and entangled with their role that they become lost in it -almost to the point of being blinded by "role narcissism" (DeVos, 1973) . Playing the role, they become complacently content and uncritical, making no effort to appreciate the original significance of the role.
Many teenagers appear to be particularly vulnerable to the complacent role narcissism. In a questionnaire I gave to teenagers in which they were asked to list three words to describe themselves, along with their strengths and weakness, ideal self and nonideal self (Shimizu, 1993a), I got the impression that some of the respondents were mechanically repeating words and phrases that are suited to idealized self-presentation. Examples of such words are akarui (lively and amicable), yasashii (kind and gentle), and the most frequently mentioned, omoiyari (empathy). My subsequent analysis, however, revealed aspects of their self-perception that are far from being so outgoing, gregarious, and nonintrospective. In response to questions regarding difficulties they face day to day in human relationships, they indicated their lack of kindness to others, and difficulty being truly empathetic to others. They also indicated a shortage of kindness and empathy among their peers. Thus, in the complacent form of omoiyari, individuals mechanically recite values or behaviors that are considered ideal in their culture without considering the personal ramifications of these values.
Sabotage
Sabotaging may be analogous to the psychiatric concept of sociopathy: the sociopaths manipulate other people and social institutions to satisfy selfish motive. Likewise, the saboteurs manipulate officially sanctioned meanings of omoiyari to justify their malevolence. For example, one of my informants, the "whipping boy" whom I call Yasuhiko, decided to use his karate skills to combat the bullies -he had been preparing to do this for years. Instead of fighting back, the bullies decided to use their streetwise intelligence. In front of spectators, they accused Yasuhiko as lacking omoiyari. They said that Yasuhiko was "bullying" them because he was using his "expert" karate skills to attack the "novices." The spectators could have known in their hearts that the bullies were the ones manipulating the norm of omoiyari to carry out their malevolent scheme. Feeling the need, however, to comply with the public ideal (tatemae) of omoiyari -that is, not taking advantage of the weak -they did not, publicly at least, point out the wrongness of the bullies' plot.
In other cases, individuals do not intend to deceive and do harm like the bullies. Rather, their private experience is such that it cannot be captured fully by the public semantic and pragmatic definitions of a cultural concept. Therefore, the individuals revise, or appropriate, the official meanings to give them more specific and personal meanings. I committed such sabotaging myself when I tried to explain the meaning of omoiyari to a class largely of Anglo-American students from my own point of view, as a Introduction 7
native of Japan. I decided to use one of the scenes described in Lafcadio Hearn's essay, "At the Station" (1896). I read it some time ago, but this episode struck me as an example that best depicted the Japanese sentiment of omoiyari. The story goes as follows. While fleeing a house he had just robbed, a man was accosted by a police officer, whom he killed. Later, the man was captured and returned by train to Kumamoto, where he had committed the murder. A crowd of spectators (Hearn was among them) waited for him at the station. The prisoner came out of the station escorted by a police detective. The detective called for the mother and child of the murdered policeman to step forward. The detective told the boy that his father was murdered by this man, and it was his fault the boy had no father. The detective told the boy to take a really good look at the man. Then the boy, frightened and sobbing, stared at the prisoner for a long time, almost as if he wanted to pierce the man with his stare. Then Hearn describes this sequence of events:
The crowd seemed to have stopped breathing. I saw the prisoner's features distort; I saw him suddenly dash himself down upon his knees despite his fetters, and beat his face into the dust, crying out the while in a passion of hoarse remorse that made one's heart shake:
"Pardon! Pardon! Pardon me, little one! That I did -not for hate was it done, but in mad fear only, in my desire to escape. Very, very wicked I have been; great unspeakable wrong have I done you! But now for my sin I go to die. I wish I die; I am glad to die! Therefore, O little one, be pitiful! -forgive me!"
The child still cried silently. The officer raised the shaking criminal; the dumb crowd parted left and right to let them by. Then, quite suddenly, the whole multitude began to sob. And as the bronzed guardian passed, I saw what I had never seen before -what few men ever see -what I shall probably never see again -the tears of a Japanese policeman.
The crowd ebbed, and left me musing on the strange morality of the spectacle. Here was justice unswerving yet compassionate -forcing knowledge of a crime by the pathetic witness of its simplest result. Here was desperate remorse, praying only for pardon before death. And here was a populace -perhaps the most dangerous in the Empire when angered -comprehending all, touched by all, satisfied with the condition and the shame, and filled, not with wrath, but only with the great sorrow of the sin -through simple deep experience of the difficulties of life and the weakness of human nature. (Hearn, 1896, p. 
11)
The problem with using this story to illustrate omoiyari is that it does not seem to live up to omoiyari's high ethical standards. As stated in Lebra's def-
